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The growth in the size and complexity of international financial markets has been one of the 
most striking aspects of the world economy over the last decade. Economists and policy makers have 
speculated on the implications of financial globalization for the design of monetary policy. Most 
central banks now follow a policy of inflation targeting. Under this policy, price stability, 
appropriately defined, is the principal goal of monetary policy. Is this conclusion altered by the 
presence of large cross border gross holdings of financial assets, where movements in asset prices and 
exchange rates may have significant wealth redistribution effects? 
In a closed economy a monetary rule devoted to stabilizing prices eliminates the inefficiency 
of costly price adjustment. In an open economy, however, the optimality of price stability as the sole 
goal of monetary policy depends on the structure of international financial markets. In former papers it 
has been shown that the absence of full international risk-sharing may interact with the inefficiency 
arising from sticky prices, so that price stability may not constitute the unique optimal goal of 
monetary policy. A drawback of many of these papers is that international financial markets are 
modelled either by the absence of any type of international risk- sharing or by full risk-sharing. In 
reality, international financial markets seem to be somewhere in the middle. Once allowance is made 
for endogenous portfolio choice, it is possible that monetary policy actually affects the structure or 
efficiency of international financial markets.  
In our paper we analyze monetary policy under various financial market configurations. In a 
first case trade in bonds and equities is possible and full international risk-sharing is achieved, for any 
monetary policy. In this case the portfolio composition of bonds and equities is independent of 
monetary policy. Then price stability is an optimal policy for conventional reasons, since it eliminates 
the welfare losses coming from slow price adjustments. On the other hand, when asset trade is 
restricted to a real non-contingent bond, deviating from price stability is in general desirable in order 
to alleviate risk- sharing inefficiencies. But in the intermediate and more realistic case, with trade in 
nominal bonds, monetary policy affects the composition of portfolios. Monetary policy plays a dual 
role. First it can be used so as to support the flexible price equilibrium of the economy. But monetary 
policy can also enhance the degree of international risk- sharing itself, by improving the hedging 
properties of nominal bonds. This second property of policy is conceptually independent of the first; it 
remains useful even in a flexible price economy. We find that in an environment where nominal bonds 
are traded, a policy of strict price stability will endogenously generate full international risk-sharing. 
Strict price stability is desirable on two counts. It supports the flexible price outcome, and it also 
allows nominal bond returns to offer full risk-sharing against country specific productivity shocks. 
 Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung 
 
Die wachsende Bedeutung und Komplexität der internationalen Finanzmärkte ist eines der 
hervorstechendsten Merkmale in der Weltwirtschaft der letzten Jahre. Wirtschaftspolitiker und 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftler haben darüber spekuliert, welche Folgen diese Entwicklung für die 
Ausgestaltung einer optimalen Geldpolitik hat. Die meisten Zentralbanken folgen heute einer Politik, 
bei der ein Ziel für die Inflation verfolgt wird. Dabei ist Preisstabilität, angemessen definiert, das 
zentrale Ziel der Geldpolitik. Muss diese Schlussfolgerung geändert werden, wenn wir bedenken dass 
Inländer in großem Umfang ausländische Finanzaktiva halten, wobei Veränderungen in deren Preise 
und in den Wechselkursen wesentliche Vermögensverteilungseffekte haben? 
In einer geschlossenen Volkswirtschaft beseitigt eine geldpolitische Regel, die die Preise 
stabilisiert, die Ineffizienzen, die mit Preisanpassungen verbunden sind. In einer offenen 
Volkswirtschaft hängt dagegen die Optimalität einer Politik, die nur auf Preisstabilität ausgerichtet ist, 
von der Struktur der internationalen Finanzmärkte ab. In früheren Papieren ist gezeigt worden, dass 
fehlende vollständige internationale Risikoteilung mit den Ineffizienzen aus trägen Preisen zusammen 
spielen kann und dass im Ergebnis stabile Preise möglicherweise nicht das einzige optimale Ziel der 
Geldpolitik sein sollten. Ein Nachteil vieler dieser Papiere ist jedoch, dass die internationalen 
Finanzmärkte entweder so modelliert werden, dass es gar keine internationale Risikoteilung gibt oder 
dass im anderen Extrem die Risikoteilung vollständig ist. Die Realität scheint aber irgendwo in der 
Mitte zu liegen. Wenn wir zulassen, dass die Portfoliowahl endogen ist, ist es möglich, dass die 
Geldpolitik die Struktur und Effizienz der internationalen Finanzmärkte beeinflusst.  
In unserem Papier analysieren wir Geldpolitik unter unterschiedlichen Annahmen bezüglich 
der Finanzmärkte. In einem ersten Fall ist Handel mit festverzinslichen Wertpapieren und Aktien 
möglich. Unabhängig von der Geldpolitik kann hier vollständige internationale Risikoteilung erreicht 
werden. In diesem Fall ist die Zusammensetzung der Portfolios von der Geldpolitik unabhängig. Aus 
den bekannten Gründen ist dann eine Geldpolitik, die Preisstabilität sichert, optimal, da sie die 
Wohlfahrtsverluste beseitigt, die aus langsamen Preisänderungen resultieren. Wenn auf der anderen 
Seite nur inflationsindexierte Bonds international gehandelt werden können, dann ist im Allgemeinen 
eine Abweichung von Preisstabilität vorteilhaft, um Ineffizienzen bei der Risikoteilung zu mildern. In 
dem realistischeren Fall mit Handel mit nicht indexierten Bonds beeinflusst die Geldpolitik die 
Zusammensetzung des Portfolios der Haushalte. Die Geldpolitik spielt hier eine zweifache Rolle. Sie 
kann genutzt werden, um ein Gleichgewicht zu realisieren, das dem bei flexiblen Preisen entspricht. 
Aber Geldpolitik kann auch dazu dienen, die internationale Risikoteilung zu unterstützen, in dem sie 
die Hedging - Funktion der Bonds verbessert. Diese zweite Funktion ist konzeptionell von der ersten 
unabhängig; sie bleibt auch in einer Welt mit flexiblen Preisen sinnvoll. Wir finden also, dass in einer 
Welt in der nominelle Bonds gehandelt werden, eine Geldpolitik, die auf Preisstabilität ausgerichtet 
ist, endogen vollständige Risikoteilung sichert. Strikte Preisstabilität ist also aus zwei Gründen erwünscht. Sie hilft ein Gleichgewicht bei flexiblen Preisen zu sichern und zum anderen Risikoteilung 
bei länderspezifischen Schocks zu ermöglichen. 
 1 Introduction
The growth in the size and complexity of international ﬁnancial markets has been one of the
most striking aspects of the world economy over the last decade. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2001,2006) document the increase in gross cross-border holdings of bond and equities, de-
scribing this as a process of ﬁnancial globalization. Economists and policy makers have
speculated on the implications of ﬁnancial globalization for the design of monetary policy. 1
Most central banks now follow a policy of inﬂation targeting. Under this policy, price stabil-
ity, appropriately deﬁned, is the principal goal of monetary policy. Is this conclusion altered
by the presence of large cross border gross holdings of ﬁnancial assets, where movements in
asset prices and exchange rates may have signiﬁcant wealth redistribution eects?
This paper explores the implications of ﬁnancial globalization for the design of monetary
policy. We can address the question raised above, because our model determines the structure
of gross holdings of cross-country ﬁnancial assets. The principal ﬁnding is that endogenous
portfolio structure does not alter the case for price stability as an optimal monetary policy.
In fact, it may even reinforce this case. In an environment where ﬁnancial markets are
incomplete, price stability is desirable because it enhances the international risk-sharing
properties of nominal assets, even without nominal goods price rigidities.
A theoretical foundation for price stability has been given by King and Wolman (1999),
Woodford (2003), and others, using sticky-price dynamic general equilibrium models. A
monetary rule devoted to stabilizing prices eliminates the ine!ciency of costly price adjust-
ment. In an open economy, however, the optimality of price stability as the sole goal of
monetary policy depends on the structure of international ﬁnancial markets. Benigno and
Benigno (2003) show that stability of producer prices is optimal when ﬁnancial markets are
complete. But Benigno (2001) and Obstfeld and Rogo (2002) show that the absence of
full international risk-sharing may interact with the ine!ciency arising from sticky prices,
so that price stability may not constitute the unique optimal goal of monetary policy.
A drawback of many of these papers is that international ﬁnancial markets are modeled
1See, for instance, Fergusen, (2005), Fisher (2006), and Rogo (2006).
1either by the absence of any type of international risk-sharing (e.g. trade in non-contingent
bonds) or by full risk-sharing (complete markets). In reality, international ﬁnancial markets
seem to be somewhere in the middle. Once allowance is made for endogenous portfolio
choice, it is possible that monetary policy rules actually aect the structure or e!ciency
of international ﬁnancial markets. Thus, the analysis of monetary policy with endogenous
portfolio structure is an important direction for this literature.
Research along these lines has been hindered by the di!culty of integrating portfolio
choice into dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. This paper resolves this
di!culty by using a methodology developed in Devereux and Sutherland (2006), which can
incorporate optimal portfolio choice in a standard DSGE setting in a tractable way. This is
combined with an otherwise standard two-country model of an open economy with staggered
price-setting. The paper allows for a range of ﬁnancial structures, diering in the number
of assets traded across countries. In one case, the only asset is a non-contingent real bond,
and there is no portfolio choice at all. In another case, there is trade in nominal bonds and
equities and given our stochastic environment, markets are complete. In an intermediate
case, nominal bonds denominated in each country’s currency can be traded. Portfolio choice
is then endogenous, but asset markets are incomplete.
The model delivers analytical solutions for gross asset holdings under each ﬁnancial mar-
ket conﬁguration. We ask how monetary policy interacts with portfolio choice in aecting
macro-economic outcomes, investigate how monetary policy inﬂuences the degree of inter-
national risk-sharing, and characterize an optimal monetary policy.
With trade in both bonds and equities full international risk-sharing is achieved, for any
monetary policy. In this case the portfolio composition of bonds and equities is independent
of monetary policy. Then price stability is an optimal policy for conventional reasons, since
it eliminates the welfare losses coming from slow price adjustment.2 On the other hand,
2Throughout this paper the focus is on optimal monetary policy from a global perspective, i.e. where
monetary policy in all countries is chosen cooperatively to maximize world aggregate welfare. In our model
price stability is the optimal cooperative policy for all parameter combinations as long as ﬁnancial markets
are complete. Benigno and Benigno (2003), who analyze a framework which is similar to the complete-
markets version of our model, show that price stability is only a non-cooperative equilibrium for certain
parameter combinations.
2when asset trade is restricted to a real non-contingent bond, deviating from price stability
is in general desirable in order to alleviate risk-sharing ine!ciencies.
But in the intermediate case, with trade in nominal bonds, monetary policy aects the
composition of portfolios. Monetary policy plays a dual role. First, it can be used so as
to support the ﬂexible price equilibrium of the economy. But monetary policy can also
enhance the degree of international risk-sharing itself, by improving the hedging properties
of nominal bonds. This second property of policy is conceptually independent of the ﬁrst;
it remains useful even in a ﬂexible price economy. We ﬁnd that in an environment where
nominal bonds are traded, a policy of strict price stability will endogenously generate full
international risk-sharing. Strict price stability is desirable on two counts. It supports the
ﬂexible price outcome, and it also allows nominal bond returns to oer full risk-sharing
against country speciﬁc productivity shocks. Even if prices are fully ﬂexible, there is still a
non-trivial welfare case for price stability, if asset markets are incomplete.
The model implies that countries are holding large osetting gross nominal asset posi-
tions, so that exchange rate movements can generate substantial ‘valuation eects’. But the
presence of these eects does not directly change the optimal monetary rule. Because portfo-
lios are chosen optimally, the wealth redistribution arising from exchange-rate-induced valua-
tion eects represent the workings of an e!cient international ﬁnancial structure. Moreover,
monetary authorities do not have to be concerned with these redistributions. It is desirable
to use the exchange rate in the traditional Friedman (1953) manner - to generate e!cient
terms-of-trade adjustment. The new insight from this paper is that Friedman’s prescription
may hold even without his underlying assumption of sluggish nominal goods price adjust-
ment. When risk sharing is obtained via trade in nominal bonds, the Friedman argument -
that it is better to use the exchange rate to facilitate terms of trade adjustment rather than
price levels - is supported, even in a fully ﬂexible price economy.
This paper is related to a growing literature on the analysis of portfolio composition and
ﬁnancial markets in dynamic general equilibrium models. The method used here is developed
in Devereux and Sutherland (2006). Related papers are Engel and Matsumoto (2006), Evans
3and Hnatkovska (2005), and Kollmann (2006). Engel and Matsumoto (2006) incorporate
endogenous portfolio choice into a complete markets version of a sticky-price open economy
macro model, focusing on the ‘home equity bias’ puzzle. They do not directly analyze the
role of monetary policy. Kollmann (2006) and Evans and Hnatkovska (2005) construct
non-monetary dynamic general equilibrium environments with endogenous portfolio choice.
Kollmann’s (2006) analysis is based on complete markets, also examining the determinants of
home equity bias. Evans and Hnatkovska (2005) employ a numerical approximation method
to solve for portfolio choice.3
A slightly older literature has examined the determinants of trade in nominal bonds.
Svensson (1989) develops a two period cash in advance model to analyze the determinants
of nominal bond trading and the welfare gains to asset trade, but does not characterize the
speciﬁc gross portfolio positions or the determination of optimal monetary policy. Bacchetta
and Van Wincoop (2000) also develop a two period endowment economy model, and focus
on the impact of nominal bonds on capital ﬂows. An early fundamental contribution is
H e l p m a na n dR a z i n( 1 9 7 8 ) .
The next section develops the open economy model. Section 3 discusses the approach
to solving for optimal portfolios. Section 4 solves for the optimal portfolios and discusses
the eects of monetary policy on portfolios. Some conclusions follow.
2 An Open Economy Macro Model
There is a ‘home’ and ‘foreign’ country. Each country is specialized in a particular range of
products. Only the equations relating to the home economy are described, since those of the
foreign economy are similar. Consumers can trade in a range of ﬁnancial assets. The menu
of assets is varied, but at its most extensive there are four assets, consisting of home and
foreign equity shares, and home and foreign nominal bonds. There are two types of shocks
in each country; interest rate (or ﬁnancial market) shocks, and productivity shocks.
3See also related papers by Devereux and Saito (2006), Ghironi et al. (2007), and Tille (2005). In
addition, Tille and Van Wincoop (2007) present a method similar to that used in this paper.
42.1 Consumers and Firms












where F is a consumption index deﬁned across all home and foreign goods, O is labor supply























where FK and FI are indices of individual home and foreign produced goods with an elastic-
ity of substitution between individual goods !> where !A1. The parameter  is the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign goods. Home and foreign goods are assumed to
have equal weight in the consumption basket. Combined with an assumption of producer
currency pricing, this ensures that purchasing power parity holds in all states of the world.
















where SK and SI are the aggregate price indices for home and foreign goods.
The budget constraint of the home country agent is:




where Zw denotes the net value of nominal wealth for the home agent, zw is the nominal
wage, and w is the real proﬁt stream of the home ﬁrm that accrues to the home country
agent. The ﬁnal term represents the total return on the home country portfolio, which is
comprised of Q assets, where Q  4.T h et e r mn>w31 represents the real holdings of asset
n, brought into period w from the end of period w  1,a n dun>w is the period w real return on
5this asset. The home consumer is the default owner of home ﬁrms and receives all proﬁts
from home ﬁrms. In cases where an international equity market exists however, claims to
home proﬁts may be transferred to foreign consumers via trade in equity shares. From the
deﬁnition of wealth, it must be the case that Zw = Sw
PQ
n n>w31> since, total w  1 asset
holdings must add up to beginning of period w wealth.4








w = NSw= (6)
And optimal portfolio choices imply:
HwF
3
w+1(un>w+1  uQ>w+1)=0 >n =1 ==Q  1= (7)
Each ﬁrm produces a single dierentiated product. The production function for ﬁrm l
is \w(l)=DwOw(l),w h e r eD is a common stochastic productivity shock, which is a random
walk process given by logDw =l o gDw31+xw>where xw is an i.i.d. shock with Hw31[xw]=0and
Yd u[xw]=2
x.
Firms maximize proﬁts. Sticky prices are modeled as Calvo-style contracts with a prob-
ability of re-setting price given by 1  = To keep the model as close as possible to the
benchmark open economy formulation, it is assumed that all prices are pre-set in terms of
producer’s currency. If ﬁrms use the discount factor lw+l to evaluate future proﬁts, then the
4Firms earn monopoly proﬁts because each ﬁrm is the supplier of a dierentiated good. Note also that,
because the home agent receives all home proﬁts, in a symmetric equilibrium with zero net foreign assets
(Zw =0 ), gross portfolio holdings exactly oset each other in value terms. This is simply an accounting
convention which simpliﬁes the development of the model, but it is not at all critical. It is easy to treat
all proﬁt income as traded on a stock market. In this case, even in a symmetric equilibrium with zero net
foreign assets, agents in each economy would have non-zero net portfolio positions. The solution method for
portfolios applies equally to this environment.























where [K>w+l represents demand for the home ﬁrm’s output.5
2.2 Monetary Authorities
Monetary policy is represented as an interest rate schedule which is subject to stochastic
ﬁnancial shocks. Monetary authorities follow a policy that adjusts the path of the rate of
return on the nominal bonds of their respective currencies. But in addition, assume that
there are ﬁnancial market shocks which aect equilibrium nominal interest rates, outside the








where pw is an l=l=g= stochastic shock such that, Hw31[pw]=0 , Yd u[pw]=2
p A 0.T h e
role of pw shocks in the model is to allow a shorthand way of introducing non-productivity
related disturbances to domestic inﬂation rates.6
Note that the rule (9) determines the nominal interest rate as a function of historic
domestic SSL inﬂation rates. We choose SSL rather than FSL inﬂation rates because it
is well known that in a benchmark complete markets open economy (without ‘cost-push’ or
government spending shocks), it is optimal (from a global welfare point of view) to stabilize
SSL inﬂation rates. The main analysis of the paper will focus on the relationship between
the stance of monetary policy, captured by the parameter , and the equilibrium portfolio
5When markets are incomplete, there is an open question relating to the discount factor w+l.I f
ﬁrms discount future proﬁts at the same discount rate as their shareholders, then both home and foreign
intertemporal rates of substitution need to enter into the ﬁrm’s evaluation of future proﬁts. However, at
the level of approximation at which the portfolio solution is obtained, time variation in the ﬁrm’s discount
factors drops out. The discount factor at this level of approximation is simply .
6Devereux and Sutherland (2007a) provide a more complete justiﬁcation for pw shocks.
7holdings among countries.
2.3 The Menu of Assets
Asset trade may take place in nominal bonds of each currency, and in the equities of each
country. Home nominal bonds represent a claim on a unit of home currency. The real
payo to a home nominal bond purchased at time w is therefore 1@Sw+1. The real price of
the bond is denoted ]E>w= The gross real rate of return on a home nominal bond is thus
uE>w+1 =1 @(Sw+1]E>w)= From the deﬁnition of the monetary policy rule, note that it must be
t h ec a s et h a tUw+1 = uE>w+1Sw+1@Sw =1 @(Sw]E>w).
Home equities represent a claim on home aggregate proﬁts. The real payo to a unit of
t h eh o m ee q u i t yp u r c h a s e di np e r i o dw is deﬁned to be w+1 +]H>w+1,w h e r ew+1 is the real
v a l u eo fh o m ec o u n t r yp r o ﬁ t s ,a n d]H>w is the real price of home equity. Thus the gross real
rate of return on the home equity is uH>w+1 =( w+1 + ]H>w+1)@]H>w.7
3S o l v i n g t h e m o d e l



















The full solution to the model is described by the sequence {Fw>FW
w > e SK>w> e SI>w>S K>w>S Iw>V w>
\w>\W
w >U w>U W
w}, {u1>w==uQ>w}, and the vector w = {1>w==Q>w} which solves equations (6)-(7),
(8)-(10) and the equivalent equations for the foreign economy.
The open economy macro literature typically proceeds by solving a ﬁrst-order approxi-
mation of a model around a non-stochastic steady state. This method, however, can not be
used in cases where there are multiple assets but incomplete markets. This is because, up
to a ﬁrst-order all assets are perfect substitutes, so the portfolio allocation is indeterminate.
7Aggregate home country proﬁts are deﬁned as w =( SK>w\w  zwOw)@Sw=
8The existing literature therefore tends to conﬁne attention to asset market structures where
the portfolio allocation problem is not relevant. This section summarizes a procedure for
obtaining optimal portfolio shares for any asset market structure by means of a second-order
approximation approach.
A full description of the method of solution for portfolio variables is contained in Devereux
and Sutherland (2006). Here, only a brief account of the approach is presented. A separate
Appendix with a more complete description of portfolio solutions is available upon request.
The method is based on an approximation where all variables except portfolio holdings are
set at their values in a symmetric non-stochastic steady state. Portfolio holdings at the
approximation point, denoted ¯ > are treated as unknowns, and the method yields a solution
for ¯ .8
First, re-write the portfolio selection equations for the home country as follows:
HwF
3
w+1u{>w+1 =0 > (11)
where u0
{>w+1 =[ u1>w+1  uQ>w+1>u 2>w+1  uQ>w+1===uQ31>w+1  uQ>w+1] is the vector of excess re-
turns, using the Qwkasset as a reference. Second-order approximation of (11) and its foreign
counterpart can be used to obtain the following:9
Hw
h³











where a hat is used to indicate a log-deviation from a non-stochastic steady state.10
Devereux and Sutherland (2006) that this equation can be used to derive a solution for
¯  by making use of the following three properties of the approximated model. First, (12) is
a second-order accurate approximation so the individual components b Fw+1 b FW
w+1 and b u{>w+1,
8In eect, ¯  represents asset holdings in a near-non-stochastic steady state.
9Assume that the innovations are symmetrically distributed in the interval [>]= This ensures that any
residual in an equation approximated up to order q can be captured by a term denoted R
¡
q+1¢
10The notation for returns is slightly dierent. Deﬁne ˆ u0
{>w+1 =
[ˆ u1>w+1  ˆ uQ>w+1> ˆ u2>w+1  ˆ uQ>w+1>===ˆ uQ1>w+1  ˆ uQ>w+1] where ˆ un>w+1 (n =1 ===Q) is the log-deviation of
un>w+1 from its value in the non-stochastic steady state..
9need only be approximated up to ﬁrst order. Second, all assets are perfect substitutes in
expectation up to ﬁrst order, so b u{>w+1 is a mean-zero i.i.d. process up to ﬁrst order. And
third, in a ﬁrst-order approximation of the model, the only aspect of portfolio behavior that
matters is ¯ .
Devereux and Sutherland (2006) describe in detail the steps involved in employing these
three properties to derive a solution for portfolio holdings. In essence, the method combines
(12) with a ﬁrst-order approximation of the non-portfolio equations of the model to yield a
solution for ¯ .
For convenience, Table 1 summarizes the ﬁrst-order approximation of the non-portfolio
parts of the model, where  = @[(1  )(1  )].W h e n  =0 , the model all prices are
adjusted in each period, so the equilibrium is that of a ﬂexible price economy. Note that, in





which is approximately the steady state portfolio to GDP ratio.
4 Equilibrium Portfolios and Monetary Policy
Three dierent asset market conﬁgurations are considered. First, assume trade only in a
non-contingent risk-free real bond (the ‘QF economy’). In this case, there is no portfolio
selection problem at all, and the solution is equivalent to the standard incomplete markets
open economy model with only intertemporal trade. To obtain this outcome in the model, the
condition Hw31b u{w =0is imposed to replace condition (12). The second case allows for trade
in nominal bonds in either currency (the ‘QE economy’). This allows for more international
risk-sharing, so long as the ex-post returns on the two bonds dier. But markets are still
incomplete, since there are four independent shocks but only two assets. Finally, allow for
trade in both nominal bonds and equity (‘the QEH economy’). This sustains complete
markets, since there are four assets with independent returns.11 The key contribution of the
11Strictly speaking, this menu of assets is only su!cient to sustain the complete markets equilibrium in a
ﬁrst-order approximation of the model. In general, it would be necessary to add a ﬁfth independent asset
(such as an indexed bond) to the QEH economy in order to sustain the full complete markets equilibrium.
This additional asset is not held in the symmetric steady state analyzed in this paper. It only comes into
10paper is the detailed analysis of the QE economy, since many previous papers have analyzed
economies with either no risk-sharing at all (QF), or complete markets (QEH).
4.1 Optimal Portfolios
The model is entirely symmetric, and is approximated around an initial steady state where
Z =0 . T h i si m p l i e st h a ti nt h eQE economy, agents in both countries will have bond
holdings that sum to zero, and in the QEHeconomy, their equity holdings and bond holdings
will separately sum to zero. Thus, for the home country, e E>QE + e 
W
E>QE =0in the QE
economy, and separately, e E>QEH+e 
W
E>QEH =0 , e H>QEH+e 
W
H>QEH =0in the QEH economy,
where an asterisk denotes the investment in the foreign asset, and the other notation is self-
explanatory.
Table 2 describes the optimal portfolio holdings in the QE and QEH economies. Note
that when  =1(unit elasticity of substitution across home and foreign goods), the optimal
asset holdings in all cases are zero. This is the Cole and Obstfeld (1991) result that trade in
goods alone ensures full risk-sharing across countries under a unit elasticity of substitution
b e t w e e nh o m ea n df o r e i g ng o o d s .I nt h eQE economy, optimal holdings of home currency
bonds are positive (negative) when A1 (?1).12 But the size of e E>QE depends on
the importance of technology shocks relative to monetary policy shocks. When technology
shocks are predominant, so that 2
D@2










To explain these portfolio shares, ﬁrst imagine that each country has a zero portfolio
share of all assets. The model from Table 1 can then be solved by setting e  =0and the
resulting solution for b Fw  b FW
w is13:
















play at higher orders of approximation, where time variation of portfolio holdings is relevant.
12The regularity condition 1+( 1˙ ) A 0 is assumed. This ensures that a home technology shock leads
to a terms of trade deterioration for the home economy.
13To simplify the notation, in deriving these expressions it is assumed that c Zw =0 . Since total wealth is
predicable one-period ahead, it has no implications for portfolio solutions.
11At the same time, if each country held a zero portfolio, the excess return on foreign bonds















Without any portfolio diversiﬁcation, (13) shows that in response to a positive home
country productivity shock, home relative consumption rises, when A1.T o h e d g e t h i s
consumption risk, home consumers should hold an asset that has a negative correlation with
home productivity. Since from (14) the exchange rate depreciates when home productivity is
positive, then it is best to have a long position in home bonds, matched by a short position
in foreign bonds. The scale of bond holdings must be proportional to 1@(1  ) since the
payo on a one period bond represents a one-time, transitory return, while the productivity
shock is a permanent income increment. Thus, in order to hedge the consumption risk from
productivity shocks, bond holdings must be large relative to GDP.
In response to a home country interest rate shock, from (13) relative home consumption
falls by
(31)(13)
(1+)(1+(31)),w h e nA1. At the same time, (14) indicates that domestic inﬂation
falls relative to foreign inﬂation, and the exchange rate appreciates. A portfolio with a long
position in home bonds will then have a positive payout, oering a hedge against the interest
rate shock. Thus, in the QE economy, for both types of shocks, consumers would like to
hold a positive position in domestic currency bonds, and a negative position in the other
country’s bonds, when A1.14
When ? 1, the opposite reasoning applies. Now b Fw  b FW
w falls in response to a home
productivity shock,15 and rises in response to a home country interest rate shock. So foreign
currency bonds represent a good hedge against consumption risk on both counts.
The extent of nominal bond holdings will depend on the degree of price stickiness. As
14This result does depend on the conﬁguration of shocks, the structure of the model, and the monetary
policy speciﬁcation. Under a monetary targeting rule for monetary policy, an optimal bond portfolio may
involve a long (short) position in foreign currency (home currency) bonds, even when A1.
15In this case the negative welfare impact of a terms-of-trade decline following an increase in x is greater
that the positive welfare eect of higher home GDP.
12 falls, there is less price stickiness, so that consumers can ignore the direct consumption








¯ ¯ ¯. Since interest rate shocks are transitory, households need to hold a
smaller bond position to hedge these shocks than productivity shocks. Thus, as 2
D@2
p
rises, gross bond portfolios will rise in both countries.









The greater are interest rate shocks, the smaller is the country’s bond portfolio. This points
to a key qualitative feature of the model with endogenous portfolio choice. In the benchmark
open economy macro model of Table 1, money is completely neutral if prices are ﬂexible,
since the model is based on a ‘cashless’ economy as described by Woodford (2003). The QF
economy reﬂects this property (see below). But in the QE economy, where agents must use
nominal bonds to engage in international risk-sharing, the excess return on nominal bonds
(i.e. the exchange rate) is aected by interest rate shocks, even in a ﬂexible price economy,
as shown in (14). Hence, interest rate shocks reduce the eectiveness of nominal bonds as a
hedging device against consumption risk due to productivity shocks.
In the NBE economy, households will also hold a positive nominal bond position in
home currency bonds (negative in foreign currency bonds) when A1,b u tw i l la l s on o w
hold a positive share of foreign equity. Unlike the QE economy, portfolio shares are now
independent of the relative size of shocks. Since markets are complete in this case, the QEH
portfolio ensures that b Fw  b FW
w =0for every possible realization of shocks. This implies that
the relative volatilities of the shocks are irrelevant for the portfolio solutions which achieve
this.





(31)(1+)+(!31)(13). If prices were fully
ﬂexible, i.e.  =0 , then no nominal bonds would be held at all, and the optimal equity
portfolio would hold a share 1
2
1
13 in foreign equity, matched by the negative of this in home
equity. This is a ‘full diversiﬁcation’ outcome. Agents in each country hold equity shares
such that, in equilibrium, they have a claim to half of the GDP of their own country, and
half that of the other country. When  =0 , the real return on equity is independent of
13monetary shocks. In this case, agents hold no nominal bonds. In contrast to the QE case,
money is fully neutral in the QEH economy, under ﬂexible prices.
More generally, with sticky prices, the real return on equity and bonds depends on both
productivity shocks and money shocks, so the optimal portfolio weights must reﬂect this. As
 rises, portfolio shares held in equity fall, while the portfolio share in bonds rises. In fact
there is an interesting discontinuity in the determination of equity holdings at  =0 .W i t h
fully ﬂexible prices, the elasticity  has no implications for equity holdings at all,16 and there
is complete portfolio diversiﬁcation. But for any positive  there is a value of  close enough
to unity such that e H>QH r 0. Thus, there can be almost complete equity home bias even
for very small degrees of price rigidity, if  is relatively close to unity.17
4.1.1 Portfolio holdings and Monetary Policy
How does the stance of monetary policy aect portfolio holdings? Using the parameter  as a
measure of the tightness of monetary policy, a higher  can be interpreted as a policy placing
more emphasis on price stability. From Table 2 the following result can be established:
Result 1: In the NB economy, a rise in  increases the gross holdings of nominal
bonds. In the NBE economy, the holdings of bonds and equities are independent of .
In the QE economy, markets are incomplete, and bond holdings have to act as a hedge
against a combination of productivity shocks and interest rate shocks. The higher is ,t h e
less impact will interest rate shocks have on the variance of consumption. As  rises, bonds
holdings are dedicated more and more to the hedging of productivity shocks, which require
higher gross holdings. On the other hand, in the QEH economy, the portfolio which achieves
full risk-sharing is independent of the relative importance of each shock, as shown above.
But the eect of changes in the monetary policy parameter  in the model is only to scale up
16This is because both relative consumption (as in (13)) and relative equity returns respond to productivity
shocks in proportion to (1  ).
17Home bias is equivalent to a value of e H>QH close to zero, since the zero-portfolio status quo implies that
the home agent owns 100 percent of the home equity. The potential for sticky prices to generate home equity
bias in portfolio is highlighted in Engel and Matsumoto (2006). These results are dierent principally due
to the dierent monetary rule employed in this paper.
14or down the relative importance of the interest rate shocks in overall volatility. As a result,
changes in the monetary policy stance which alter the share of total volatility due to the
dierent shocks have no impact on the portfolio shares in the QEH economy.
4.2 Risk-Sharing and Portfolio Holdings
Now we focus on the risk-sharing implications of the portfolio positions under each asset
market structure, and describe the optimal monetary policy rules in each case. To avoid
issues of non-cooperative behavior, deﬁne an optimal monetary rule as one which maximizes
the sum of expected utility across home and foreign households. Since the model is fully
symmetric, in equilibrium expected utility is equalized across countries. Moreover, because
the welfare distortions due to both price stickiness and incomplete assets markets may be
separated, an optimal monetary policy rule may be described without explicitly solving a
welfare-maximizing policy problem.
As a measure of risk-sharing, Table 3 reports the conditional variance of relative con-
sumption movements; yduw31(b Fw  b FW
w ). In addition, for each case, the Table reports con-
sumption variance yduw31(b Fw).18
It is easiest to begin the description of Table 3 from the NBE case, in which markets are
complete. In this case, there is full risk-sharing. Since there is no home bias in preferences
or real exchange rate variability, consumption is equalized across countries. Due to price
stickiness however, monetary policy does aect the variability of consumption. A policy of
strict price stability will eliminate the eect of interest rate shocks on consumption. This
captures the traditional role for monetary policy. By eliminating the eect of sticky prices,
monetary policy replicates the ﬂexible price equilibrium with complete markets. In other
words, as seen from Table 3, setting  $ 4 in the QEH economy is equivalent in its eect
18While the e!ciency of assets markets in risk-sharing can be assessed by the degree to which yduw1(b Fw
b F
w ) diers from zero, there is no special welfare signiﬁcance to the use of yduw1(b Fw) as opposed to the
conditional variance of output or employment in either country. The comparison of yduw1(b Fw) across the
three asset market conﬁgurations serves to illustrate the dierent characteristics of monetary policy in the
QF and QEH economies as opposed to the QE economy. In particular, monetary policy is important in
the ﬁrst two cases only to the extent that  6=0 . Finally, as noted above, all conditional variances are well
deﬁned, despite the unit root in the wealth distribution.
15to setting  =0 . Since markets are complete, then it must also be the case that full price
stability is an optimal cooperative monetary policy in the QEH environment.19
In the QF economy there is a failure of international risk-sharing, except in the special
case where  =1 . Monetary policy can enhance risk-sharing by eliminating the impact of
interest rate shocks on consumption. Conceptually however, this works in the same way as
in the QEH economy. That is, monetary policy enhances international risk-sharing only by
supporting the full ﬂexible price equilibrium of the QF economy. Moreover, monetary policy
cannot attain full international risk-sharing. Even in the ﬂexible price equilibrium house-
holds cannot use non-contingent bond trade to oset the consumption risks of productivity
disturbances.20 Within this restricted class of monetary rules, a policy of price stability is
still optimal in the QF economy. But it may be inferred from the results of Benigno (2001),
Obstfeld and Rogo (2002) and Devereux (2004), that an alternative monetary rule (e.g. a
rule which responds to both the interest rate and the exchange rate), which leads allocations
to deviate from the ﬂexible price equilibrium would do better. An alternative rule would
act so as to eliminate interest rate shocks, but also lead consumption and employment in
each economy to respond more closely to that of the equilibrium with complete markets.21
Hence, price stability is not e!cient within a wider class of monetary rules.
In the QE economy, the stance of monetary policy has a more complex eect. This is
because monetary policy aects the holdings of nominal bonds in each currency. Monetary
policy has a two-fold eect on risk-sharing. First, as in the QF and QEH economies, by
setting  $4 , monetary policy can in the traditional manner, support the ﬂexible price
equilibrium and eliminate the inﬂuence of interest rate shocks on consumption volatility.
But the monetary stance also endogenously enhances international risk-sharing. A policy
of strict price stability leads agents to concentrate their gross nominal portfolio holdings
towards eliminating country speciﬁc productivity shocks, and allowing them to ignore the
19It is assumed that any distortions associated with monopoly pricing are eliminated by optimal subsidies.
20If productivity disturbances were temporary, then non-contingent bond trade would oer some risk
sharing beneﬁts. In this case also, monetary policy can enhance the sharing of consumption risk due to
productivity shocks, but it still cannot achieve fully e!cient risk sharing.
21See Benigno (2001) for an elaboration, within a model almost identical to our NC economy.
16presence of interest rate shocks. In doing so, increasing  generates eectively complete
international assets markets. Table 3 indicates that as  $4 , yduw31(b Fw  b FW
w ) goes to




2 . Thus, price stability leads to the equivalence of the
QE and the QEH economies.
The enhanced role of monetary policy in the QE economy is distinct from the traditional
function of monetary policy in eliminating the eects of sticky prices. To see this, take the
case of fully ﬂexible prices; i.e.  =0 . Then there is no role for monetary policy at all in
the QF or the QEH economies. But in the QE economy, monetary policy still plays a role.


























The monetary stance parameter  still appears in (15) and (16), even though  =0 .M o r e o v e r
both consumption variance and the degree of risk-sharing are aected by the variability of
interest rate shocks. By setting  $4monetary policy eliminates the inﬂuence of interest
rate shocks, ensuring that yduw31(b Fw) in (15) approaches the consumption variance of the
NBE economy, and that yduw31(b Fw b FW
w ) in (16) approaches zero. The inﬂuence of monetary
policy in this case operates purely through its ability to enhance the eectiveness of nominal
bonds in hedging country speciﬁc productivity disturbances. The relative return on nominal
bonds is given by the unanticipated change in the exchange rate. When  =0 > the conditional











By pursuing a policy of price stability, the policy-maker ensures that the distribution of
returns on nominal bonds depends only on productivity shocks, and is independent of interest
rate shocks.
17The welfare implications for the QEeconomy follow immediately from these observations.
Price stability is an optimal policy in the QE economy, even though markets are incomplete.
Price stability is optimal for two reasons. First, it eliminates the eect of sticky nominal
prices. Secondly, even if all prices were ﬂexible, price stability is still optimal because it
ensures that the real return on nominal bonds reﬂect only the e!cient fundamental shocks
to productivity, and are independent of interest rate shocks. This ensures that households
may use nominal bonds to achieve full cross-country risk-sharing. Therefore, price stability
supports the ﬁrst-best allocation.22
The discussion of this sub-section may be summarized as follows:
Result 2: a) In the QF economy, international risk sharing is limited, and an optimal
monetary rule would in general deviate from price stability; b) In the QEH economy,
there is full risk international sharing, and price stability is optimal because it repli-
cates the ﬂexible price equilibrium; c) In the QE economy, price stability is optimal,
because it replicates the ﬂexible price equilibrium, and at the same time generates full
international risk-sharing.
The generality of these results is discussed below. Note however that if there were no
interest rate shocks, then there would be full risk sharing, independent of , since in this case
the exchange rate would reﬂect only productivity shocks. But even in this case, monetary
policy is important in the sense that nominal exchange rate ﬂexibility is required for nominal
bonds to share risk. If one or both countries acted so as to peg the nominal exchange rate,
then no risk-sharing at all could be achieved in the QE economy.
4.3 Capital Flows and Exchange Rate Volatility
The previous section showed that a policy of price stability can act so as to enhance inter-
national risk-sharing as well as sustain a ﬂexible price equilibrium. What implications does
22It is important to note that this result does not depend on our restricted class of monetary rules. Any
monetary policy rule that generates full risk sharing can be fully optimal only if it also supports price
stability. Even when  =0 , an optimal policy using a wider class of monetary rule than (9) will ensure that
the nominal exchange rate responds e!ciently to productivity shocks, and SSL inﬂation is zero.
18this have for exchange rates and capital ﬂows? Since exchange rates aect the returns on
nominal bonds and equity, this question also relates to the issue of how monetary policy
should aect the distribution of asset returns.
Table 4 illustrates the implications of each asset market environment for the behavior of
the current account (locally equivalent to the trade balance) and the exchange rate. The
table shows the variance of the current account and the exchange rate as a function of the
underlying interest rate and productivity.
4.3.1 Exchange Rate Volatility
From Table 4 it can be seen that in the QF economy, for both interest rate and productivity
shocks, exchange rate variability is lower, the higher is , while the same mechanism does
not operate in the QEH economy. This is due to the income eects of shocks, causing labor
supply to move in the opposite direction to consumption and output, acting so as to stabilize
the terms of trade. This channel does not operate in the economy with full risk-sharing across
countries. But these eects will partially operate in the QE economy, since risk-sharing is
not perfect in that case.
How does exchange rate variability dier across the three dierent asset market conﬁgu-
rations? First, focus on a comparison of exchange rate variability for a given value of  and
2
p. Using the relevant rows of Table 4, the following result can be established:
Result 3: For given values of  and 2
p exchange rate volatility across regimes satisﬁes
the following inequalities: yduw31({Vw)QEH  yduw31({Vw)QE  yduw31(Vw)QF=
The expressions for yduw31({Vw)QEHyduw31({Vw)QE and yduw31({Vw)QEyduw31({Vw)QF
are shown in Table 4. Both expressions are positive, for A1. Thus, exchange rate volatility
is greatest under the complete markets regime, and lowest in the regime with no risk-sharing
at all, with the nominal bond economy lying somewhere in between. Notice from the expres-
sion for yduw31({Vw)QEH  yduw31({Vw)QE, if either type of shock is absent, then exchange
rate volatility is equal in the QEH and the QE economy. This follows from the results
19of the previous section, since with only one type of shock, nominal bonds can achieve full
risk-sharing.
Result 3 indicates that increasing the number of assets traded increases exchange rate
volatility, for a given monetary rule. But the previous section showed that the monetary
rule itself could alter the eective degree of completeness of assets markets. This raises the
question of how the stance of monetary policy inﬂuences exchange rate volatility.
From inspection of Table 4, it can be seen that under both the QF and QEH economies,
a policy of price stability unambiguously reduces exchange rate volatility, since it eliminates
the direct component of exchange rate volatility coming from interest rate shocks. Under the
QE economy however, the monetary stance aects exchange rate variability both directly
through the aect of interest rate shocks and indirectly through altering the composition of
the portfolio. The ﬁrst eect will clearly reduce exchange rate volatility, but from Result
3 the second eect may increase exchange rate volatility, since it moves the QE economy
closer to the QEH economy. Again using Table 4, the following may be established:
Result 4:A ni n c r e a s ei n may either increase or reduce exchange rate volatility. In
addition, the relationship may not be monotonic.
This result can be veriﬁed by looking at a special case of yduw31(Vw)QE where prices are
ﬂexible ( =0 ). In that special case:
Cyduw31(Vw)QE
C







2(1 +   )+
2
p(1 + (  1))
2) (17)
If A(1 + )@, this expression may be positive. The more important are productivity
shocks relative to interest rate shocks, the more likely it is that the expression is positive.
Moreover, the relationship may be non-monotonic, since when A(1 + )@,( 1 7 )i sm o r e
likely to be positive, the higher is  itself. Since price stability is an optimal monetary policy
in, in the QE economy, it follows that an optimal policy may involve either increasing or
reducing the volatility of asset returns.
20In the more general case however, with some price stickiness, the direct channel of mon-
etary policy on exchange rate volatility becomes more important. In fact, calibration of
the general value for
Cyduw31(Vw)QE
C suggests that it is likely to be negative in the range of
empirically relevant parameter values.
4.3.2 Capital Flows
It has been shown that monetary policy aects the gross portfolio position in the QE econ-
omy. But the monetary rule also impacts on net capital ﬂows. This is described in Table
4. Given that productivity shocks are permanent, in the economy without risk-sharing, a
productivity shock has no impact on the current account, since there are no gains from in-
tertemporal consumption smoothing following a productivity shock. Table 4 indeed indicates
that under the QF economy, the current account is aected only by interest rate shocks. In
comparing the QEH and QF economies for a given monetary policy rule, the volatility of
the current account is unambiguously higher in the complete markets case. It is also possible
to show that the current account is more volatile in the QE economy than the QF economy,
although the comparison between the QE economy and the QEH economy is theoretically
ambiguous.23
In the QF and QEH economies, Table 4 indicates that a rise in  always reduces the
volatility of the current account, since it tends to eliminate the component of the current
account that is due to interest rate shocks. But in the QE economy, a rise in  also increases
the weight put on hedging against productivity shocks in the optimal portfolio. This tends
to increase the volatility of the current account, since the more that productivity shocks are
hedged, the more the country will engage in trade imbalances as a result of the risk-sharing
of these shocks. To illustrate this mechanism, again focus on the special case where  =0 .
In that case:
Result 5: In the QE economy with  =0 , current account volatility is increasing in .
23For  =0 , the volatility of the trade balance is always higher in the QEH economy. But for a high
degree of price stickiness, this conclusion may be reversed.
21This result may be conﬁrmed by noting from Table 4 that the volatility of the current
account is independent of 2
p in both the QF and QEHeconomies. But in the QEeconomy,
















Expression (18) implies that interest rate shocks reduce the volatility of the current
account, since consistent with the previous results, they reduce the usefulness of nominal
bonds in supporting risk-sharing. An increase in  eliminates the eect of these shocks on
bond returns and enhances the eectiveness of nominal bonds in risk-sharing. Hence it
increases the variability of capital ﬂows.
When A0, the conventional channel of monetary policy operates. In that case, a policy
of price stability may either increase or reduce the volatility of capital ﬂows.
5 Generalizing the results
The analysis above is restricted to a special case, with utility linear in leisure, no home
bias in preferences, and permanent productivity shocks. This is necessary only so as to
obtain manageable algebraic expressions. The solution procedure also gives solutions for
more general cases, but they can be interpreted only through calibration and numerical
solutions. But even so, the qualitative results of the paper are unchanged in more general
cases. Conceptually, it is straightforward to see why this is so. Even under more general
conditions, but remaining within a framework where there exist just productivity and interest
rate shocks, a monetary policy which supports the ﬂexible price equilibrium in the QE
economy will lead to an endogenous movement towards completeness in ﬁnancial markets.
Therefore, because it eliminates all welfare distortions, this policy must be fully optimal.
With a more general extension of the model, the results would have to be qualiﬁed
somewhat. For instance, if more shocks are introduced, it is no longer true that price stability
22facilitates full risk sharing in the QE economy, since eliminating interest rate shocks as a
source of variability in bond returns would not allow for complete markets. For example the
model can be extended to allow for common shocks to the preference for home vis a vis foreign
goods. In that case, price stability does not generate full risk sharing in the QE economy.
But price stability is fully optimal in the QEH economy, because with productivity interest
rate and preference shocks, setting  $4e l i m i n a t e st h ei m p a c to fp r e f e r e n c es h o c k so n
bond returns, and allows a portfolio of equity and nominal bond holdings to support full
risk-sharing (an Appendix, available on request describes this model more fully).
Of course more generally, for a wider mix of country-speciﬁc shocks, an explicit welfare
comparison across alternative monetary rules would be necessary. This would require higher
order solutions.24 Nevertheless, the principle that monetary policy has a role to play in
enhancing the e!ciency of nominal asset returns would still remain.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper shows how a simple benchmark two-country sticky-price open-economy macro
model can be amended so as to incorporate endogenous portfolio choice. We solve for the
optimal portfolio holdings of national equities and nominal bonds, and show how these
depend on the magnitude of stochastic shocks, the degree of price stickiness, and the stance
of monetary policy. A key result is that a monetary policy of strict price stability is desirable,
not just because it sustains the ﬂexible price equilibrium outcome of the real economy, but
also because it endogenously generates full international risk-sharing. This argument for
price stability holds even in a fully ﬂexible price economy, and arises due to the fact that
such a policy maximizes the risk-hedging properties of nominal bond returns.
More generally, our results suggest that while ﬁnancial globalization alters the environ-
ment within which monetary policy operates, it may not alter the fundamental objectives of
optimal monetary policy.
24In addition, it would be necessary to compute higher order elements of portfolio solutions of the type
described by Devereux and Sutherland (2007b)
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25Table 1 Linear approximation of the model for given ¯ 
Optimal consumption Hw(b Fw+1  b Fw)= Hw(b FW
w+1  b FW
w )
Budget constraint c Zw+1 = 1
c Zw + b \w  b Fw1
2b w + e 
0b u{>w
Home output b \w=1
2[b Fw+b FW
w (b SK>wb Sw)  (b SK>wb Vwb SW
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Home monetary rule K>w+pw= (Hw b Fw+1b Fw)+Hw[K>w+1+1
2b w+1  b w]
Foreign monetary rule W
I>w+pW




2b w+1 + b w]
Note: A bar over a variable indicates its value at the approximation point
and a hat indicates the log deviation from the approximation point except for
ˆ u0
{>w+1 =[ ˆ u1>w+1  ˆ uQ>w+1> ˆ u2>w+1  ˆ uQ>w+1>===ˆ uQ31>w+1  ˆ uQ>w+1] and c Zw = Zw@¯ \=
K>w and I>w are the inﬂation rates of producer price, deﬁned as
K>w = b SK>w  b SK>w31 and I>w = b SI>w  b SI>w31 and  = @[(1  )(1  )]=
ˆ w = b SW
I>w + b Vw  b SK>w is the home country terms of trade=
26Table 2: Optimal Portfolio Holdings



















































































Note: l is given by
l =( +)
2 £
(1 + )2 + 
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Note: [> C> s and \ are given by
[ = ( + )
2 £
2(1 +  + (  1)(1 + )) + 
2¤
C =2 ( 1+)( + )
2(1 +  + (  1)(1 + ))
s =2 (  + )(1 +  + (  1)(1 + ))
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